Case Law Update: Riding Circuit

The last few months we've seen a number of interesting decisions from the federal circuit courts of appeal, both on issues of State law and under the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act. These cases not only raise a few interesting legal issues, but they also amplify some practical concerns that lawyers and litigants should be aware of.

Soarus LLC v. Bolson Materials Int'l Corp. (Seventh Circuit)

This short decision from the Seventh Circuit stems from a short commercial non-disclosure agreement in the 3D printing industry. In essence, the dispute stemmed from a patent application carve-out to a broad confidentiality restriction. The defendant, Bolson, sought to acquire and use a type of specialty polymer in its 3D printing process, agreeing in turn with Soarus to keep information about the polymer confidential.

But the NDA contained a carve-out, which said that notwithstanding this intellectual property protection, Bolson was "free to patent and protect any new application" using the polymer in a specific type of process. Bolson in fact did so, leading Soarus to argue that Bolson breached the NDA.

The Seventh Circuit rejected Soarus' argument that no reasonably company would seek to protect confidential information around a new product and also allow that party to file information in a public document with the U.S. Patent Office. Under Illinois law, those subjective expectations could not trump an unambiguous contract provision, which the patent application carve-out was.

A relatively straightforward case of contract interpretation, to be sure. But the practical lesson is important. Commercial NDAs can arise in a number of different situations, including deal evaluations and supply arrangements. The problem is that the forms used for these situations don't necessarily translate, based on the specific business concerns underpinning the relationship. Here, Bolson and Soarus seemed to have addressed how Bolson could have used otherwise protected information in a patent filing. But a much more common situation is to have the parties sign an NDA that may have been perfectly fine for one transaction that is ill-suited to another. These particular nuances can include not only the ability to use information in patent filings, but also restrictions on which employees a party can solicit or hire, whether parties acquire any intellectual property rights or merely have the right to license them, and when the agreement expires.

NDAs are a very common commercial agreement. But the details of the restrictive clauses must align with business expectations. There is an inherent danger in simply copying a template that looks really pretty.

A copy of the opinion is available here.

Dunster Live LLC v. Lonestar Logos Management Co., LLC (Fifth Circuit)

The Defend Trade Secrets Act has only been the subject of a few circuit court decisions. In one from last year, the Tenth Circuit rejected the argument that a moving party could presume irreparable harm when evaluating a preliminary injunction predicated on a DTSA claim. And other decisions haven't told us much at all.

The DTSA reared its head again in Dunster Live LLC v. Lonestar Logos Management, but only in a cameo role. In that case, the defendant sought attorneys' fees after the plaintiff dismissed its trade secrets action without prejudice. The case stemmed from a classic business divorce, but the plaintiff soon ditched its trade secrets claim, opting to streamline its case and refile in state court. The Fifth Circuit found that the defendant was not the "prevailing party," a requirement for fee-shifting under the DTSA's bad-faith provision.

It appears the defendant raised a host of arguments for why it prevailed, but the most intriguing was the idea that the district court denied the plaintiff's preliminary injunction motion. The Fifth Circuit rejected this, holding that "prevailing party status ordinarily requires being ahead when the final whistle blows in a case, not at halftime."

Of interest to readers, the defendant racked up $600,000 in attorneys' fees before the voluntary dismissal order was entered. That's a lot, but not outrageously so if the preliminary injunction resembled a merits trial (which many do). Still, it is understandable why the defendant pulled out all the stops in seeking fees if they achieved some success short of a full win, before the plaintiff called an audible.

A copy of the opinion is available here.

Brand Services LLC v. Irex Corp. (Fifth Circuit)

The Fifth Circuit weighed in on another procedural issue under trade secrets law, one that has split courts and vexed commentators. The issue is whether the preemption clause of the uniform trade secrets act (here, the act was Louisiana's version) means that a plaintiff is barred from pursuing a civil law conversion claim for confidential information that fails to qualify as a trade secret.

In Brand Services v. Irex Corp., the court held that the preemption clause doesn't extend that far. While it's generally non-controversial that a plaintiff cannot sue for conversion of trade secrets, courts have been less willing to extend preemption to confidential information. The issue can be very confusing for lawyers and parties because it is common for claims to meld the two concepts. Often times, plaintiffs will allege something to the effect that the defendant misappropriated "confidential information, including trade secrets." Very infrequently, a plaintiff will demarcate the two in a way that allows a court to understand fully what the plaintiff is claiming as trade secrets and what it is contending as lesser-protected confidential information.

What the Fifth Circuit is saying in Brand Services is that for the latter category, a plaintiff can maintain a conversion claim for civil theft without invoking trade secrets law. That alleviates the burden of proof on some important issues, like reasonable secrecy measures. In Brand Services, the Fifth Circuit was persuaded by some intermediate appellate court law in Louisiana that took a narrower view of preemption. It bolstered its finding by looking to the text of the preemption provision, which does seem to leave open some room for common-law torts related to theft of confidential, but non-trade secret, information. For those interested in examining the range of court cases and the split of authority, footnote 4 to the Brand Services opinion contains an exhaustive range of citations.

A copy of the opinion is available here.

AirFacts, Inc. v. De Amezaga (Fourth Circuit)

The Fourth Circuit's recent opinion in AirFacts, Inc. v. De Amezaga is one of those fairly fact-intensive cases that provide only helpful guidance and not any particular rules or standards. The basic facts are fairly familiar, but for our purposes here one issue of trade secrets law caught my eye.

The employee who was sued sent himself (to a personal email account) a particular spreadsheet on his last day of employment. Part of the employer's trade-secret claim hinged on this fact. The key question: did that act rise to the level of misappropriation (for the document itself earned trade secret status)?

Here, a number of facts compelled the circuit court to adopt the district court's finding of no misappropriation. Those facts were:

• The employee's supervisors told him they might contact him if they had questions about his work;
• The employee testified this is why he sent the spreadsheet to his personal e-mail account;
• The trial judge found him credible.
• The employee did not access the spreadsheet after he left and did not disclose them to any third-party;
• Other employees regularly worked from home, which included using personal email accounts for work purposes.

This particular issue recurs time and again in departing employee scenarios, and as AirFacts demonstrates, the question of liability is intensely fact-specific. What are the lessons to be learned?

From the company's perspective, it could have dealt with this better by instituting policies and procedures that bar the use of personal email for work purposes, by clarifying the ex-employee's obligation at departure, by asking him whether he had anything in his account that was company related, and by conducting a thorough exit interview.

From the employee's perspective (though he won, he still got sued), he could have sought pre-clearance to retain the spreadsheet. That would have eliminated any factual dispute about his authority to send the document to his personal account. And he should not have deleted the sent item from his work folder, which certainly raises suspicion about his intent (though the district court didn't seem to care much).

Many disputes like this end up in court simply due to a breakdown in communication. It is pretty clear that this was not anywhere close to a theft situation. But neither party covered themselves particularly well before litigation ensued.

A copy of the opinion is available here.

Cleaning Up the Janitorial Mess

Somewhat predictably, the reaction to C&W Facility Services non-compete lawsuit against janitorial employee Sonia Mercado was swift and severe.

I wrote about this last week, offering my opinion on a number of different facets to this ill-advised lawsuit. This dispute got mention not just on the nerdosphere, but also mainstream outlets including the Financial Times and the Washington Post.

After the Post published its piece, Cushman & Wakefield (an affiliate of C&W) issued a statement withdrawing the case and apologizing to Ms. Mercado. It also offered to pay her the bonus she had given up in an attempt to avoid triggering the non-compete. Here's the apology:

"Following recent media reports related to the use of restrictive agreements with our janitorial staff, we have completed a review of the circumstances. While we do have restrictions with a select number of salaried managers, we have found that this policy was incorrectly applied in this instance. We are taking action to correct this situation. We sincerely apologize to Ms. Mercado. Restricting the employment of hourly workers is inconsistent with our policies and contrary to our values as an organization.”

There are two ways to view this. First, C&W may have just tried to pull a fast one and then issued an apology when it got caught in a media firestorm. That's probably the most plausible. Second, someone at C&W may have authorized counsel to take action without clearing it through the appropriate channels. That, too, is quite plausible. At least, that's the narrative C&W's statement seems to be trying to sell.

I maintain, as do others, that Ms. Mercado was never a real target. She was a pawn, used as part of a tactical gambit against C&W's competitor. (To continue the dorky chess analogy, she became a passed pawn ready to mate the other side until it resigned.) This happens far too often in non-compete litigation, when one individual gets caught in the crosshairs of a much larger message-sending dispute. Common or not, that is not an appropriate use of legal process.

In the end, it is at least gratifying that this story had a just ending to it. But it never should have been written in the first place.

***

One noteworthy item. The Fifth Circuit, applying Louisiana law, has taken a narrow view of the preemption doctrine applicable to statutory trade-secrets claims. States that have adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act frequently confront the question of preemption. That is, when do other claims based on trade-secrets theft have to give way to just the statutory claim itself? The so-called narrow view is more in line with the text of the statutory preemption clause. In other words, a plaintiff cannot use another tort claim that invokes trade-secrets misappropriation. Common victims include conversion and breach of fiduciary duty. But as the Fifth Circuit held in Brand Services LLC v. Irex Corporation, claims based on misuse of confidential information that is not a trade secret do not fall within the preemption provision.

This is a textual reading of the statute, endorsing a narrow view of preemption and rejecting a more pragmatic approach favored by many courts.

Back from Hiatus (Part II): State Law Updates

Last week, I discussed three examples of Illinois courts analyzing similar non-compete issues in very different ways, a post that amply illustrates how difficult it is for lawyers to predict outcomes for clients. It also reminded me of a famous Abraham Lincoln quote: "Discourage litigation. Persuade your neighbors to compromise whenever you can. Point out to them how the nominal winner is often a real loser - in fees, expenses, and waste of time. As a peacemaker the lawyer has a superior opportunity of being a good man. There will still be business enough."

But to be sure, many people ignore Lincoln and litigate anyway - often with profoundly silly reasons motivating them.

So because we have litigation, we have legal developments and I therefore have a blog that continues to chug along. And you continue to read, meaning I must update you with some new rulings over the past several months.

California:

The infamous, long-running case involving ex-Korn/Ferry International executive David Nosal may have reached its end, with the Supreme Court declining a cert petition and the District Court now having finally decided on the scope of Nosal's restitution to KFI. United States v. Nosal is the most notable case under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, which generally criminalizes unauthorized access to protected computers. Nosal had its roots as a garden-variety trade secret case, but it was a criminal prosecution and tested the CFAA's limits.

Ultimately, Nosal secured some victories along the way. But still he will serve a year in prison and pay restitution to KFI. As to the scope of restitution, KFI sought about $1,000,000 in legal fees incurred to assist the Department of Justice investigation. After the Ninth Circuit weighed in KFI, will have to settle for less: $164,000. Still a heavy price to pay for Nosal, who probably deserved a civil suit but definitely does not deserve to spend a year in prison.

Connecticut:

The case of Datto, Inc. v. Falk discussed whether a forfeiture-for-competition clause was reasonable and enforceable. A minority of jurisdictions apply the same, or at least a similar, non-compete standard to these clauses, which (as one might expect) enable an employer to clawback certain benefits if an employee leaves to compete.

Forfeiture clauses range in scope, frequently calling for the forfeiture of unvested stock options but sometimes also calling for the employee to pay back income earned from the exercise of a grant within a certain period before the end of employment. Datto involved a dispute as to whether the cancellation of certain stock options were void because Falk (an ex-Chief Revenue Officer) accepted a position with a competitor.

The court was bound to apply Delaware law on the question of reasonableness, and that law in my view is somewhat confusing. Precedent, in effect, equated true non-competes with forfeiture clauses, finding they accomplished the same results. That's not necessarily true. A forfeiture clause may incent future performance, while a non-compete unquestionably tries to protect a separate economic interest beyond employee loyalty.

Datto illustrates the confusion in its analysis, though the district court judge admittedly was bound by controlling law. He noted, for instance, that the forfeiture clause was reasonable because "[t]his is not a case of an employee who is barred altogether from working for the competition anywhere in the world."

In my opinion, courts ought to use varying levels of scrutiny when examining restraints, similar to the current First Amendment jurisprudence. Specifically, I think that for employment-based non-competes, courts should use the strict scrutiny test (which by and large, they say they do), and for sale-of-business non-competes, they should examine them under a rational basis inquiry.

For mid-tier restrictions, like franchise non-competes and forfeiture clauses like that in Datto, I would use intermediate scrutiny. That test would require courts to determine whether the restrictive means used (e.g., the scope of the event triggering the forfeiture) are substantially related to the interest the restraint is designed to protect. This test, though it may not be perfect, would at least provide courts with a flexible, coherent way to analyze less problematic covenants that lack adhesive properties.

New York:

The New York Court of Appeals answered a significant question of damages related to trade secrets claims in the case of E.J. Brooks v. Cambridge Security Seals. The Court held that a plaintiff's damages cannot be measured by the costs the defendant avoided due to unlawful activity.

If a principal goal of trade secret law is to encourage innovation, then a cost-avoidance theory of damages seems to be a logical means to further that goal. Stated another way, if the misappropriation shortens a product-development cycle and enables X to bring a product to market more efficiently, then X is unjustly enriched by not incurring research-and-development expenses.

In the Court's view, cost-avoidance is inconsistent with a compensatory theory of damages. And under New York law, only the plaintiff's losses count. Cost-avoidance theory resembles unjust enrichment, but because New York has not adopted some variation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act -- which specifically allows for unjust enrichment-type damages -- the theory is not viable.

The holding, predictably, spurred a long and persuasive dissent. It summarized the pragmatism and utility of cost-avoidance damages, noting that they are "generally much simpler than, and less subject to challenge than, lost-profit damages, which makes them an attractive alternative for plaintiffs who are willing to forego a potentially larger recovery in favor of a smaller, more certain one." (The assumption of a "smaller" recovery reasonably invokes the principle that a developer does not spend X to recover X. Normally, a rational economic actor would spend X to recover some multiple of X.)

A link to E.J. Brooks is available here. I emphasize again that I view this as a distinctly New York rule of law, and not one likely to be adopted across jurisdictions that have embraced a more flexible approach to damages.

South Carolina:

In Hartsock v. Goodyear Dunlop Tires North America, Ltd., the Supreme Court of South Carolina recognized an evidentiary privilege for trade secrets, but held the privilege was "qualified." That means it is different than, say, an attorney-client privilege or one barring self-incrimination. By "qualified," the Court held that a party seeking the disclosure of trade-secret material must show a "substantial need" for it that is relevant to the specific issues involved in the litigation. If a proponent makes that showing, the trade-secret holder still can gain the benefit of a protective order over the compelled disclosure.

The decision is, to be certain, a weird one. This is not really a privilege rule, but rather a rule of discovery that calls upon courts to make a balancing decision. If anything, this rule will create confusion where none should exist.

Texas:

Everything is bigger in Texas, including damages and attorneys' fee judgments. In the long-running case of Quantlab Technologies v. Godlevsky, a federal district court awarded the plaintiff its attorneys' fees in a trade secrets suit for what the court called defense behavior that was "so acrimonious, vexatious, and indefensible that...[it] exceeds any that this judge has seen in his nineteen years on the bench." The case involved stolen technology in the high-frequency trading industry, and the court at various times had sanctioned the defendants for destroying or failing to preserve evidence.

The price for that behavior was a fee judgment of $3,220,205 against each individual defendant.

The plaintiff didn't fare so well in GE Betz v. Moffitt-Johnston. There, the Fifth Circuit held that under Texas law, a company failed prove than ex-employee breached a customer non-solicitation covenant. The employee succeeded despite "highly suspicious" computer activity, including the mass download of data to an external device. But the company couldn't prove that any contacts with customers amounted to solicitation of business, rendering the contract claim unsupportable.

The Fifth Circuit did, however, vacate a large fee award for the ex-employee. Texas law allows an employee sued on a non-compete violation to obtain fees if the employer knows the agreement is overbroad and sues to enforce the agreement to an extent greater than necessary to protect the employer's interests. That's a hard standard to meet, absent some damaging admission or a truly terrible agreement. And the employee here didn't do so. 

Trade Secret Litigation Statistics Revisited

Thank God for firms like Skadden Arps.

Unlike some terrible "national" law firms that attempt to blog and end up shoveling out worthless drivel, Skadden regularly publishes great content (not to mention high-quality lawyering).

This January 23 post is no different and provides very helpful, practical information for trade secrets attorneys and litigants. Though the article is titled "The Rise of Trade Secret Litigation in the Digital Age," some of its most interesting tidbits focus on statistical measures.

For instance, Skadden notes the following:

• Trade secrets cases increased 14 percent per year from 2001 to 2012. This runs against the grain, as civil litigation statistics confirm a steady downward trend of filings.
• Trade secrets holders have a recent success rate of 69 percent at trial.
• Trade secrets cases are dismissed at a lower rate (22 percent) than other types of complex civil litigation actions.
• In recent trade secrets cases, only 2 percent resulted in preliminary injunctions -  a surprising trend, given that historically the rate is 10 percent.

Data on litigation outcomes is not easy to come by. Federal court statistics generally can present a skewed picture, given the high percentage of prisoner 1983 actions. So data aggregated on a macro basis is not reflective of all litigation. A high percentage of cases settle very early, so we don't know how meritorious all filings are.

But generally, the public literature shows a few general points to keep in mind, which dovetail nicely with what Skadden summarized:

• Contract claims usually fare better than tort claims. Trade secrets actions are more akin to tort suits.
• Federal court jury verdicts tend to be a bit higher.
• Tort actions involving products liability and medical malpractice fare worse than other civil actions, somewhat skewing the tort number downward. This is even more pronounced in federal court.
• In trade secrets cases where the employee was the alleged misappropriating party, the plaintiff was nearly twice as likely to obtain a preliminary injunction as when the claimed wrongdoer was a former business partner.

The bible, if you will, on statistical analysis of trade secret litigation comes from David Almeling, and his article is available here.

Generally, my rules of thumb are as follows. And bear in mind that these are grounded less in statistics and more in anecdotal experience and general kibitzing with other nerds:

• A court will dismiss a trade secrets case on the pleadings less than 10 percent of the time (assuming no abject incompetence on the plaintiff's part).
• Preliminary injunctions are successful at a rate of 20 and 30 percent.
• Of those, at least 75 percent are partially successful and deny the plaintiff part of what it seeks.
• Summary judgments motions are 50/50 propositions at best, but in trade secrets cases the legal standards push that down closer to 40 percent. Non-compete claims are more amenable to summary judgments.
• At trial, plaintiffs in commercial actions win some material claim at a 60 to 65 percent clip.
• In 85 percent of jury cases, a trade secrets lawyer will put at least two jurors asleep.
• In 100 percent of cases, judges beg the parties to try and settle.

The Trade Secret Status of Football Game Plans

For the second day in a row, The Wall Street Journal identified interesting questions concerning the law of trade secrets. Today's article comes in the wake of the Alabama-Georgia national title game, which Alabama won in dramatic fashion.

The question the article raises is pretty simple and quaintly summarized: are football game plans trade secrets?

The article explores this question rather indirectly, given WSJ's apparent effort to use Freedom of Information laws to seek these game plans from public universities. My readers will be stunned to learn that the recipients of these FOI letters were less than forthcoming.

One of the traditional exceptions to disclosure of public documents is that information's trade secret status. For their part, FOI laws contain slightly different definitions of trade secrets than do federal and statutes designed to guard against misappropriation. For example, the so-called Exemption 4 under federal law allows for the protection of trade secrets and "commercial or financial information obtained from a person [that is] privileged and confidential." The Supreme Court never has interpreted Exemption 4.

So let's look at Alabama, whose flagship school's football game plans were the subject of the WSJ article today. Alabama's Open Records Act contains no exemption for trade secret material, which is odd but no more odd than sending Roy Moore twice to the state Supreme Court. Though I haven't researched any other statutory basis the University of Alabama may have to withhold game plans under a records request, the Open Records Act does not appear to do so.

Aside from this, the larger question is quite intriguing. Are game plans actually trade secrets?

The best analogy I can come up with is the scripts for popular television serials, a subject I wrote on several years ago in the lead-up to the final Breaking Bad episodes. I've since changed my conclusion and do not believe those scripts are trade secrets, though they can be protected contractually. Why do I say that?

The answer comes straight from the statutory definition of a trade secret. We'll use the 1979 Uniform Trade Secrets Act, whose definition is most in use. The term "trade secret" means that the information must:

(1) derive independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and

(2) be the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.

While much of the text would suggest popular television scripts are protectable, the highlighted part illustrates why they're not. How, for instance, would any other production company, studio, or network gain from knowing what the plot lines of a series finale are? They wouldn't. In all likelihood, the only remedy that the script owner has is contractual. That is to say, the owner could claim that improper disclosure by an insider bound to a confidentiality clause reduced the economic impact of a television run, such as through lost advertising fees.

My rationale, though, supports giving game plans trade secret status.

Let's start with the basics. Those game plans are valuable, in that they reveal compilations of plays, schemes, coverages, and strategies for a variety of in-game scenarios. So too, there are economic interests at stake, as college football is a business. Universities stand to gain in myriad ways from successful football programs.

And game plans, unlike television scripts, are useful to competitors - even if only to the competitor whose being schemed against in the game plan. So assume that the University of Georgia has a copy of Alabama's game plan. It should know the preferred set of plays for 3rd-and-short. It would know how Alabama's blitz patterns. And it may know whether Alabama wants to deploy a trick play on special teams. That would provide it economic value in the form of a marginally better chance of winning a game, which in turn could yield significant economic gains for the university.

The oft-used defense of reverse engineering likely would not be a good one as applied to game plans. Those plans change week to week based on a variety of factors, including newly obtained personnel, injuries to key players, past performance, competition level, and even the weather. Knowing what Alabama did on 3rd-and-short against Fresno State in September is only marginally helpful when it faces a different defensive scheme, and totally different personnel, against Georgia the following January.

The rather unique aspect of game plans, though, is that they likely have a very short useful life as a trade secret-even for a matter of days. That is to say, anyone can watch tape of last night's game and deduce what Alabama's preferred blitz coverages looked like. They could, in theory, reconstruct a game plan in large part. And again, obtaining a game plan for Georgia would prove marginally helpful, if at all, next season when Alabama opens its season with new players and new schemes.

Today's WSJ article is a fun read and even notes that the paper reviewed Alabama's defensive game plan for its first-round playoff win against Clemson. No one from Alabama seems too worked up about that, suggesting that game plans aren't a trade secret for very long. As one of the Alabama assistants even said, "There's some good information in there, but I don't understand it."

Most people, even other college coaches, wouldn't either. The idea of game plans as trade secrets is academically interesting and challenges us to apply timeless concepts to unique situations. But the debate is still largely theoretical.

Sinovel Wind Turbine Case Heads to Trial

The Wall Street Journal reported today that the Wisconsin trade secrets case of United States v. Sinovel Wind Group Co. is scheduled to begin trial this week. The criminal case highlights the growing problem of intellectual property theft by state-sponsored organizations in China. And it further illustrates that multi-national organizations often target vulnerable inside employees to aid and abet in brazen acts of theft.

The Department of Justice back in 2013 issued a Press Release detailing the charges against Sinovel Wind and several individuals, including a former employee of American Superconductor, the victim of alleged trade secret theft. According to the indictment, American Superconductor developed software that controlled the flow of electricity from wind turbines to electrical grids. This software source code is at the heart of the indictment for trade secret theft. The allegation of misappropriation centers on Sinovel's apparent acquisition, through an ex-employee, of the software to produce wind turbines that it previously agreed to buy from American Superconductor.

The charging documents outline a familiar, if not sloppy, pattern of insider theft. The FBI, for instance, was able to discover that the rogue American Superconductor employee used Skype to communicate with Sinovel regarding the stolen source code. He also e-mailed Sinovel to discuss the source code and to send repairs to the source code. Of note, the ex-insider frequently traveled to China to work on Sinovel, which at one time constituted 80 percent of American Superconductor's business. The alleged theft resulted in a drop in American Superconductor's market value from roughly $1.6 billion to approximately $200 million.

For those interested to see what a real trade-secrets theft investigation looks like, and the level of detail undertaken with respect to a forensic analysis, I highly recommend a read through the key charging affidavit, embedded below.

Finally, a topic that frequently comes up in trade secrets cases is closure of the courtroom. On December 28, the court stated that "the trial of this case will be conducted in open court, unless a strong showing is made that some evidence must be kept from public disclosure." The court allowed for limited courtroom protections for trade secrets that were the subject of the government's indictment, but denied any corresponding protection to Sinovel on the basis that it had not made the appropriate showings to gain such protection.

Sinovel Charging Affidavit.pdf by Ken Vanko on Scribd

It's Just Business as Usual for the Year 10 Kick-Off

The more things change, the more they stay the same.

If I had to make three predictions for 2018, they would have been as follows:

(1) Legislators across the U.S. will introduce non-compete bills, which will advance at a glacial pace with incredibly unimpressive results.

(2) Frivolous non-compete and trade secrets suits will continue unabated, and I will break three keyboards writing about them.

(3) Waymo and Uber will end up going to trial, and the court will render a mixed verdict. At some point, Paul Clement will sign an appellate brief for one of the parties.

***

It is January 5, and we seem to have checked the box on numbers 1 and 2.

Representatives in the Vermont General Assembly have introduced a bill that would establish a categorical ban on non-compete agreements, much in the mold of the North Dakota and California statutes. The proposed legislation contains the usual carve-outs for negotiated sale-of-business and partnership-style non-competes. A copy of the bill is available here. This may be the last we hear of it.

Move a stone's throw to the East, and a gaggle of New Hampshire senators have introduced Senate Bill 423, which would ban non-competes for low-wage workers. Similar to the Illinois Freedom to Work Act, the term "low-wage worker" includes those earning the greater of the federal minimum wage or $15 per hour. This is a common-sense reform that probably stands a decent chance of passage. The Senate Bill is available here.

***

The State of Ohio, and people with some connection to the Buckeye State, have produced some pretty terrible trade secrets and non-compete litigation. Which saddens me, because I went to Ohio State.

Well, the trend seems to continue with a company in the business of producing something called "precision braided textiles" filing what appears to be a really crappy suit against a former employee. A&P Technology sued a terminated Phil Lariviere on the theory of inevitable disclosure of trade secrets. Lariviere, a former engineer, sat out his broad, two-year non-compete before obtaining subsequent employment through a recruiter with one of A&P's competitors.

A&P then filed suit claiming that Lariviere's intimate knowledge of everything A&P placed its trade secrets at risk, as if time stood still during the two-plus years Lariviere was gone. The Southern District of Ohio mercifully denied this injunction against Lariviere, despite his relatively hostile attitude to his former employer. The injunction briefing contained some rather amusing exhibits about Lariviere's social media posts, texts, and e-mails. Why? A&P felt that anger and hostility suggested an intent to steal trade secrets.

No reason for this theory appears to be offered, and the court saw through it. According to Judge Black, "Lariviere's mockery of the former employer who terminated him and then sued him is not demonstrative of any actual effort or inclination to violate his contractual obligation to protect the confidentiality of A&P's trade secrets." Maybe this was an unfortunate choice, but I sympathize here with Lariviere. He should be pissed about getting sued on a specious claim after abiding by his non-compete.

An equally interesting aspect of the opinion concerns Lariviere's smart move to force A&P to identify its trade secrets with specificity. The shotgun nature of A&P's claim all but forced Lariviere's hand to proceed this way. And the court was persuaded, ordering A&P to list out its "suspected misappropriated trade secrets" before demanding the same of Lariviere and his new employer. The main impetus for the discovery ruling appears to have been the substantive weakness of A&P's case.

You can review the order and opinion at the end of this post. A further link is available here. It is well worth a read for lawyers and litigants, as the discussion spans a number of substantive and procedural topics likely to recur.

***

In the Waymo v. Uber litigation, the so-called Jacobs letter has received a great deal of attention. The letter was originally part of a dispute between Jacobs and Uber. But it has been interjected into the trade-secrets trial of the century, centered on the conduct of former engineer Anthony Levandowski. The most salacious part of the Jacobs letter was the allegation that former CEO Travis Kalanick had sanctioned trade secrets theft. To be sure, the Jacobs story will be a featured part of the upcoming trial. And to that end, Judge William Alsup, who is overseeing the case, issued a recent Order unlike any I've ever seen.

***

A&P Technology v. Lariviere (Order) by Ken Vanko on Scribd

38 Minutes of Hell

I've represented defendants in some pretty stupid lawsuits. But 2017 is proving a banner year.

Earlier this year, I had client get served with a claim for inevitable disclosure of trade secrets. From the outset, the case was a pure head-scratcher because there were no facts that so much as hinted at trade secret misappropriation. And, here's one for ya, my client had a non-compete agreement. In point of fact, he did leave his job to go work for a company in the same industry.

So why on earth would the plaintiff not sue on its non-compete and proceed on the inevitable disclosure claim?

Simple.

The Illinois Appellate Court previously had found this company's non-compete unenforceable as a matter of law. It turns out the company learned nothing and never altered its void non-compete in any meaningful way. So, quite obviously, a contract-based claim would have gone nowhere.

So enter inevitable disclosure - the Kim Jong Un of legal claims. The theory was that my client couldn't work for a competitor on the grounds that he inevitably would disclose his former employer's trade secrets - in effect a diabolical work-around to a non-compete that the employer knew it couldn't enforce.

We had none of it, filed a motion to dismiss, and won. It was not close.

The plaintiff's lead attorneys - probably operating under directions from their client to abuse the legal process and prevent competition - then filed a bad-faith, frivolous amended complaint trying to add facts that would suggest some plausible risk that my client might disclose trade secrets.

The facts in this new complaint were so hopelessly convoluted they took about 3 pages of allegations to explain the theory, an ersatz diatribe laden with a cloak-and-dagger reference to a "Customer 1" (as if this is some sealed indictment). The logic was tortured and made no sense, due in large part to the fact that my client had no contact with "Customer 1" and the sequence of events was totally fucked up.

Luckily for the plaintiff, they had another attorney. A really good one, kind of a local counsel, who had common sense. And I feel this attorney must have put the brakes on all the dicking around after I notified everyone that Complaint 2.0 sucked just as badly as the first version.

So the case settled. The plaintiff released us from the non-compete it had and got zero out of the case except a bunch of obvious representations from my client that he had done nothing wrong. (This, I am quite certain, the plaintiff knew. But who the fuck cares about the truth when your client pays your padded bills?) There's no doubt the plaintiff dodged a sanctions motion (which I would have taken up to the appellate court for free in the unlikely event we lost).

But what did law firm insist on in the settlement agreement? A deposition of my client. That's right - a deposition after the case settled, after the claims had been released, and after the action had been dismissed with prejudice.

Who thinks of this garbage? Is this part of orientation day, where you get schooled on how to maximize the billing opportunities in your file? Or is this client-driven, an attempt to show that, frivolous suits be damned, I'll have the last word by golly!?!?

So the purpose of the deposition? To confirm my client was telling the truth in the settlement agreement when he represented he didn't take anything and wasn't soliciting his former clients. As if he would do that. In yet another epic move, the plaintiff's lawyer calls me and tells me he does this sort of deposition all the time.

By that, I now assume he meant that he files a bunch of stupid cases, dismisses them, and then bills for more work after the case is over. We agreed because we had nothing to hide and just wanted this over.

The deposition went forward yesterday. And that's where the title of this post - "38 Minutes of Hell" - comes in.

It wasn't 38 minutes of hell for me. And it damn sure wasn't 38 minutes of hell for my client. It was 38 minutes of hell for them. Because big law firm (two lawyers) and big corporation got to sit across the table from me and my client and see how utterly fucking stupid their lawsuit was. I hope it was as humiliating as it felt. I know it was.

Why do I share this story?

For all the non-compete apologists out there, another story needs to be told. This kind of bullshit that I just told in this blog post goes on every day. Lawyers who file and maintain frivolous anti-competitive suits need to know that it will not end well. It could be a big fee judgment. Or it may be an appellate court telling them their clients' non-compete is awful.

Or it could be just as satisfying - 38 minutes of hell, pure and utter humiliation, watching a replay of your crappy work before your very eyes.

The Reading List (2017, No. 29): Frivolous Litigation in the Northern District and Uber (Allegedly) Covers Up

Non-Compete and Trade Secrets News for the week ended December 1, 2017

***

Another Dumb Lawsuit in Illinois

Sorry. I call it like it is. And this lawsuit was stupid. I've been waiting to write on it for some time, after the preliminary injunction order came out this Summer. But I've been busy. Now's the right time.

In an action filed in the Northern District of Illinois, a company called Cortz, Inc. sued an erstwhile acquirer of its business, Doheny Enterprises, Inc., and a purchasing manager named Tim Murphy? Why? Beats me. Here's the gist. And it should sound a familiar refrain for lawyers like me who see this kind of silly litigation nonsense every single week.

Cortz, a pool and spa products supplier, had a business with declining income. Doheny wanted to buy but was turned away. The parties had signed a non-disclosure agreement, which (like most in the transactional sphere) said Doheny couldn't hire Cortz's management-level employees for two years. Fair enough.

Enter Murphy. He was fired from Cortz after its eventual buyer, some outfit named Leslie's Pool Supplies, demanded a two-year non-compete from him. This was an entirely rational business decision to make for both. Leslie's saw a way to use market power and tie up a dude it felt might be key to its business. Rational, yes. Smart, maybe not. Murphy, to his credit, balked. He had been with Cortz for nearly 20 years, apparently had no ownership stake and no role in the sale, and all of a sudden some acquirer demands a non-compete. Murphy probably had a few sleepless nights, but good for him drawing the red line. Cortz (now a Leslie's subsidiary post-deal) fires Murphy. As was its right. Probably stupid, but whatever.

As one might imagine (you know, since there was a lawsuit), Murphy (out of work) hooked on with Doheny on a trial basis. Cortz then decides to sue, claiming this hiring violates the NDA's non-solicitation provision. (One almost can imagine the lawyers salivating over the prospect of potential work.) Cortz made that decision even though Murphy was not then employed by Cortz and even though Cortz made the business judgment to fire him. Of course, no one thought to draft the NDA in a way that covered past employees. But Cortz tried to make that claim during the litigation.

Big fail. Hard stop.

Judge Amy St. Eve, probably one of the top three district court judges in Chicago, had none of it, stretching no further than basic principles of contract construction. If you're going to draft a deal-based NDA with a restrictive covenant, damn sure better cover what you're trying to restrict. The linguistic gymnastics that Cortz tried to pull off here were not exactly compelling.

No judge should have any patience for this sort of after-the-fact hooha, in which a commercial contract party tries to use litigation to mulct an unambiguous agreement into one which they wish they had signed. (Doubtful, mind you, Doheny would have signed a naked restraint that barred its hiring of those not employed by Cortz. Why on earth would it do that?)

Nor was Judge St. Eve moved by Cortz's other claim, that Murphy used trade secrets of Cortz in negotiating vendor prices. (His prior job was purchasing, so apparently his knowledge of vendor costs was the motivating force here.) The factual basis for this claim, to be frank, is so hopelessly unintelligible that it might not be worth even reading it. (Still, if you care to do so, the link to the opinion is available here.)

Thankfully, the case was dismissed shortly after this injunction hearing. What exactly did Cortz get out of this? A totally silly lawsuit that probably cost it $150,000? For what gain? So it could thump its chest and blow off some steam? There's not a single fact in here suggesting financial loss much less an actionable claim of wrongdoing. Not one fact even hints at a threat of trade-secret misappropriation, or even opaque, intangible harm.

This is quite similar to two separate cases I've had this year, both of which ended unceremoniously in dismissal orders. One was a deal-based NDA where the plaintiff dicked around with the unambiguous language of a non-solicitation covenant during litigation, tried to twist it into something totally at odds with the plain terms of the agreement, and then suffered a quick defeat. The other was a case involving claimed trade secrets over knowledge of vendor costs - once again with no evidence of misappropriation. That case, too, ended quickly.

Knowing that other clients and lawyers have to defend such trifling drivel is something I can take comfort in. But it does not make it any more acceptable or tolerable. Cortz, and its counsel, are lucky this thing ended with no fee-shifting.

Waymo-Uber Litigation

Speaking of lawsuits gone bad, Uber's counsel did not have a good week.

In the trade-secrets trial of the century, Judge Alsup delayed the start of Waymo v. Uber indefinitely. The reason: Uber allegedly failed to disclose to Waymo evidence that suggests a corporate culture hell-bent on misappropriating trade secrets of rivals. It is never good, of course, when the judge tells you: "on the surface, it looks like you covered this up."

But so said Judge Alsup after a pre-trial evidentiary hearing that featured an ex-Uber employee named Richard Jacobs testifying about internal business practices at Uber that were, charitably put, shady. He testified, for instance, that Uber instructed employees to use disappearing chat apps and sent employees to bootcamp in Pittsburgh (of all places) and taught them how to impede and obstruct legal investigations.

The testimony, and forthcoming discovery, is highly relevant because it calls into question Uber's position that it has not used any of the allegedly confidential files taken by Waymo's ex-engineer, Anthony Levandowski, before he joined Uber. That said, Jacobs had no knowledge of Uber using any of Waymo's stolen files. Still, many trade-secrets cases are about circumstantial, not direct, evidence. And what Jacobs said certainly strengthens Waymo's case.

The sordid tale is making the rounds in all major news outlets. But I recommend The New York Times piece here and CNBC's coverage here.

The "Inevitable Disclosure" Non-Compete Clause: What is it and for God's sakes...why?

Leave it to lawyers to see an obscure, narrow, and disfavored legal theory and then try to drive a mack f**king truck through it like it's the next great revelation.

To what might I refer? Try a non-compete on steroids, one so hopelessly inane and stupid that, at first blush, it actually has some appeal. Until, of course, you analyze it and put more than three minutes of thought into what you're doing.

I refer to this unicorn (in the eyes of some) as the inevitable-disclosure non-compete, the intersection of obscurity and protectionism. Allow me to explain how this bad-ass of contractual clauses works (until it's declared invalid).

Start with the basics.

An agreement may have several different types of post-employment covenants that bind the employee. You have your standard non-disclosure clause, which limits for a period of time the use of confidential information the employee learned. Then you have your non-solicitation covenant, which may preclude work with a group of valuable clients or recruitment of co-workers.

Hard stop for a second.

Those two types of covenants have some legitimate uses. But lawyers must still draft them reasonably and with sensible scope and time limits, even if a geographical one isn't needed.

I continue.

Your agreement may even have a general, market-based non-compete that bars work in a relevant industry.

Hard stop again.

This type of covenant needs to be even more carefully tailored, given its broad economic hardship on the person agreeing to the covenant. It limits work, not a type of work or a narrow subset of work activity. Here, we need activity limits, probably a shorter duration, and in many (but not all) cases a geographic scope confined to the employee's or company's sphere of influence.

An inevitable-disclosure non-compete is profoundly different. It requires the employee to refrain from accepting employment that may require him to use, disclose, or rely on the employer's confidential information. This precise type of covenant recently was held unenforceable in the case of Sullivan v. Gupta, M.D., LLC, No. 2:17-cv-609 (E.D. La. Aug. 10, 2017), because it failed to comply with the requirements in Louisiana for enforceable restraints of trade. (Among other things, State law requires an identification of which parish the non-compete applies to, and this one didn't cut the proverbial mustard.)

This is by no means the first case to find that a stealth non-disclosure agreement constitutes a non-compete.

I have my own experience with agreements like this, and it hasn't been positive (except for the fact that we've won). I blogged a few weeks ago about our trial and appellate victory in Automated Industrial Machinery, Inc. v. Christofilis, 2017 IL App (2d) 160301-U, where the Second District affirmed a fee award for my client, the defendant, of nearly $1.5 million.

One of the issues in that case concerned a non-compete, which the trial court found invalid for lack of consideration. The Appellate Court affirmed that ruling. But it didn't discuss the terms of AIM's non-compete. Had we not prevailed on the consideration issue, we had a strong argument on invalidity (not to mention lack of breach, for which there was no evidence).

That agreement was a true inevitable-disclosure non-compete, and I reprint below the operative restriction, which is stunning in scope:

Pretty rough start when you call your non-compete clause a "doctrine of inevitable disclosure." Who the hell thought of that one? Way to be pedantic, and nice way to warm up to a judge.

Beyond that titular snafu, look at the terms. Just two low-lights to point out:

(1) It applies in perpetuity if my client "could not help but rely on or use...or would otherwise inevitably disclose Confidential Information." Who makes that call? How is that agreement one containing definite terms, a plain requirement under contract law?

(2) The employee must provide the company with, basically, a job description and then beg for permission to take it. And the company has 20 days to decide whether "such ...employment is prohibited under the doctrine of inevitable disclosure."

So a clause like this, patently unenforceable and overbroad, vests the employer with sole discretion in perpetuity to decide whether a particular position would require the employee to use its confidential information.

This violates every conceivable principle of non-compete law. No certainty at all. Vast amounts of discretion reserved to the employer to veto an employee's career choice. No time limit to speak of (beyond what the employer itself decides is appropriate). Economic protectionism, to be sure, is not a legitimate business interest.

Bottom line: You use an agreement like this, you deserve to lose. And you will.

The Reading List (2017, No. 27): Judicial Rock-Stars,Forum-Selection Clauses, Attorney General Suits, and Worthless Blog Posts

Non-Compete and Trade Secrets News for the week ended November 10, 2017

***

Vicarious Liability Ruling in Waymo v. Uber

For those of you following the driverless car technology trade secrets lawsuit between Google and Uber, I urge you to take a break from the day-to-day litigation filings. They're interesting, to be sure. But they ain't as interesting as this article in The Verge about the judge presiding over the case, William Alsup. I can't do it justice. Read it. It is stunning.

On to more mundane topics in this case: vicarious liability. One of the defendants, Otto Trucking, is out of the case. Judge Alsup granted its summary judgment motion, soundly rejecting Waymo's theory of vicarious liability for the actions of its founder, Anthony Levandowski, the former star engineer whose mass download of files is the heart of Waymo's suit. The court specifically relied on Waymo's strategy to divide and conquer, an effort that kept its claims against Levandowski out of court and the other defendants out of arbitration. As Judge Alsup stated, Waymo could not treat the two as "fungible targets."

The issue of vicarious liability doesn't arise much in the case law, at least in terms of nuanced legal analysis. One line of cases holds that respondeat superior, or vicarious liability, is not available under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act on the grounds that it is a common-law remedy preempted by the statute. Other cases take a more flexible, case-by-case approach, relying on the equities. Judge Alsup's idiosyncratic opinion avoids this discussion entirely, and it's bereft of a single case citation. That doesn't make it uninteresting or even wrong.

To me, the better approach - one textually consistent with the state and federal statutes - is to assess each defendant separately and to determine whether the relevant conduct for each amounts to misappropriation. This is, I think, what Judge Alsup is saying. He eschews any reference to statutory preemption, but it's just a different way of getting to the same result.

Maryland Non-Compete Agreements

Judge Paul Grimm, another total judicial rock-star, struck down a five-year, market-based non-competition clause against a high-level engineer, a ruling summarized in Allied Fire Protection, Inc. v. Thai, 2017 WL 4354802 (D. Md. Oct. 2, 2017). The particular non-compete had the feel of being an amalgamation of form clauses, designed specifically to instruct lawyers on how not to draft non-competes.

For starters, the duration was five years - something sure to align the court with the affected employee. Those limits may be acceptable in the sale-of-business context, where there's equal bargaining power, but they almost never have any justification for at-will employees. Then the employer decided to bar the employee from working in a "similar" business with any of the plaintiff's former, current, or future clients. No parameters. No illustration of why. No common sense.

Judge Grimm's ruling that the non-compete was not tailored to protect a business interest, in the main, is not surprising. But it is significant that it arose in the context of a motion to dismiss, and not after the evaluation of evidence at the injunction or summary-judgment stage. These kinds of early, case-dispositive rulings happen all too frequently, but they embody a pragmatic approach sorely needed in litigation featuring an asymmetry in resources. Judge Grimm was careful to note the lack of allegations demonstrating the need for such broad covenants, a point that enabled the early dismissal.

Practice tip: if you're an employer, never lead with a frivolous argument. For reasons that confound, the employer decided it was a good idea to challenge the removal petition - the case originated in State court - on the grounds that removal jurisdiction violated Article I, § 10 of the United States Constitution - the so-called impairment-of-contracts clause. But as Judge Grimm noted, that clause applies to the States, not the federal government (and it was, after the federal government's jurisdiction that was challenged constitutionally). This approach to argument does nothing to endear one to the court.

Forum-Selection Clauses Following Atlantic Marine

On to a more challenging venue issue.

Venue, jurisdiction, and choice-of-law are heavily litigated procedural issues in non-compete and trade secrets litigation. Though it may seem like in-the-weeds, lawyer drivel, questions of procedure can be consequential. For instance, a few years back, Illinois courts held that Florida choice-of-law clauses are unenforceable because they contravene public policy. If that issue weren't litigated, cases may have come out differently.

Venue clauses may be equally as important. The Supreme Court, in Atlantic Marine Construction Co v. U.S. District Court, endorsed forum-selection clauses and has held courts must honor them in all but the most unusual cases. Practically, that means that only certain public interests (outside of any interests the litigants assert) will justify a transfer when a forum-selection clause is present. That means litigants cannot get out of a choice-of-venue clause if it is inconvenient to them. Predictably, district courts have followed Atlantic Marine and have cut back on the number of transfer orders in federal non-compete cases.

The Third Circuit, this Summer, addressed a difficult question under Atlantic Marine: how should courts apply the ruling when some, but not all, defendants are bound to forum-selection clauses that designate different federal districts? Get ready for some freakin' procedure, folks...

According to the court, there's a four-step inquiry (always a BAD sign). First, courts will apply Atlantic Marine to parties with forum-selection clauses, meaning their claims may be severed and transferred to the agreed-upon forum.

Second, courts then consider public and private interests related to the non-contracting parties (such as a corporate defendant with no direct contractual relationship to the former employer). Here the factors may suggest that the same forum is appropriate for both the contracting and non-contracting parties. And that may be enough for the court to kick or keep the whole action.

Third, if the court finds that the first two steps point in opposite directions, then it must consider severing the claims. That means that a court may need to transfer the action as to some defendants while retaining jurisdiction over others. For instance, a court may lack personal jurisdiction over a non-contracting defendant. It couldn't keep the case, in that instance, for efficiency reasons.

Fourth, if the issue of severance is not clear, then the court must evaluate "efficiency" interests and the non-contracting parties' private interests. Here, a court could find that public interests "overwhelmingly" outweigh the parties' interest in upholding the venue clause and thereby decline to enforce it.

The application of this four-step approach is fairly intricate, but the circuit court's analysis will resemble many of the same issues that arise in multi-defendant non-compete litigation, where individuals have forum-selection clauses and the new employer operates in a venue remote from the contractually chosen one. A link to the opinion is available here.

***

I am not sure I understand the point of drafting worthless, uninteresting blog posts. But if you are a blogger (or aspiring to start one), then I would highly recommend reading the latest entry on the Employment Trial Report. It's a classic example of what not to do. This post caught my eye when it showed up in a blast e-mail through Lexology and purported to "analyze" a $6.8 million trade-secrets judgment in California. Sounds f**kin' awesome, bruh!

No. For starters, don't waste everyone's time talking about a default judgment involving a defendant who has no legal representation and who "failed to participate in the subsequent damages proceedings." What is the takeaway there? It's good to have a lawyer? It's advisable to contest damages? It's best to show up in court for a hearing?

And then don't tell us how the judgment demonstrates that companies "need to be vigilant and act quickly and decisively when it appears" there's theft by an insider. Has anyone ever counseled an employer that, in such a situation, companies should be sluggish and move slowly and equivocally?

Sorry, but you clog up the blogosphere and so you deserve some opprobrium. Take a stand. Say something interesting. Offer a viewpoint. Don't spew drivel. And I could care less if the mandate from the firm's Executive Committee was to fill up the site with more posts...

***

Thad Felton over at Greensfelder in Chicago writes about the Attorney General's non-compete lawsuit against Check Into Cash of Illinois, Inc., calling the move "somewhat unusual." A better description would have been "entirely appropriate." The Freedom to Work Act, signed into law effective January 1, 2017, bars employers from using covenants not to compete against so-called "low-wage employees." This is a move that has gained traction across the United States, as State legislatures seek to pare back the use of overbroad restraints that do nothing to promote economic freedom and serve only to stifle competition.

According to the Attorney General's suit, brought under the Freedom to Work Act, the common law, and the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, the affected employees were store clerks, assistant managers, and managers, many of whom were paid on an hourly basis. The non-compete, recited in a pain-staking block quote, is oppressively overbroad and disconnected to any legitimate business interest. It's obviously unenforceable, despite the thatchy, semantic jungle in which the contractual language is buried.

A copy of the Attorney General's complaint is available here.

Much Overdue Case Law Update, Part II

This week, I offer my second case-law update, highlighting a variety of cases from around the company on topics of interest.

***

Indiana Court Affirms Nationwide Non-Compete Agreement

Last Friday, the Court of Appeals of Indiana addressed the enforceability of a nationwide non-compete agreement for an engineer in the glass container business. The facts follow a typical pattern and deal generally with a senior-level engineer's move from Ardagh Glass Containers to Owens-Illinois. (As an aside, my paternal grandfather worked at Owens-Illinois for something like 35 years, during which time he consumed approximately 364,000 unfiltered Camel cigarettes working the assembly line, kind of a poor man's Don Draper in this respect.)

The employee's non-compete barred his work anywhere in North America and covered products over which the employee contributed development knowledge. The Court of Appeals, applying Pennsylvania law, enforced the non-compete, reasoning that both Ardagh and Owens competed nationally for the same type of customers. The court also remarked on a few typical facts in enforcing the preliminary injunction: (1) the employee's lack of candor on a few important facts that pertained to consideration and his "paid-leave" status at Owens-Illinois; and (2) the employee's lack of urgency in contesting the preliminary injunction and the appeal.

Of greater concern was the court's breezy trade-secrets analysis, which seemed to excuse an improper trade secrets identification at trial. The court all but found the injunction order was too broad in finding that Ardagh Glass identified 16 categories of trade secrets that were at risk. And it found Ardagh Glass would need to do better at a permanent injunction hearing. But the court was not engaged at all in assessing whether the at-risk secrets were actually "threatened" from misappropriation.

A link to the Court of Appeals' decision in Vickery v. Ardagh Glass Inc. is available here.

Forfeiture-on-Termination Clause Found Unenforceable

This one is crazy.

Kelley Rieves took a job as an assistant manager at Buc-ee's - a convenience store chain in Texas. It was at that point that Buc-ee's and its cadre of lawyers foisted upon her a historically stupid agreement. Rieves had the ability to decide how she was going to get paid - but it had to be a split between hourly wages and a flat monthly amount.

The catch? The flat amount had to be repaid to Buc-ee's if Rieves (at at-will employee) left within 5 years and didn't give 6 months' notice. This is known (by me) as the stick-without-the-carrot approach. Rieves and Buc-ee's re-upped a year later with a similar arrangement. Rieves, of course, left before the 5-year period ended and filed suit to declare the repayment provision unenforceable. Somehow, Buc-ee's convinced a state court judge to enter an award for payment of the entire amount owed (less taxes) under the contract's repayment clause.

Rieves appealed and, mercifully, won. Common sense prevailed. The reason? A repayment clause inhibits employee mobility. And unless the contract is consistent with non-compete law, it's unenforceable. The salary disgorgement provision, here, was totally unlike a prototypical forfeiture clause that would, for instance, cancel unvested stock options if the employee leaves to compete. Instead, it had no connection to incentivizing the employee's future performance, imposing an illogical and disproportionate penalty on an at-will employee's election to find a better job.

Buc-ee's should be publicly shamed for requiring Rieves to sign such a manifestly stupid agreement. For now, at least we have a public opinion - available here - that will prevent any sort of spurious litigation like this in the future.

Federal Circuit Affirms $91 Million Trade Secrets Verdict

In an unpublished ruling, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a $91 million trade-secrets verdict arising out of a business transaction gone wrong in the mitral-valve implant market. The particular invention at issue in that case arose after Neovasc sought to collaborate with CardiAQ and provide CardiAQ with ancillary products. During the course of their relationship, Neovasc apparently designed a competing transcatheter mitral valve implant that was similar to the one CardiAQ had developed. Neovasc learned of the TMVI device after signing a non-disclosure agreement.

The Federal Circuit approved the district court's award of $70 million in compensatory damages and $21 million in enhanced damages (along with an 18-month head-start injunction). The court rejected several claims Neovasc had made concerning the trade secret instructions given to the jury. And it further found CariaAQ's royalty damages testimony was supported by the evidence. This is yet another in a series of high-damage trade secrets judgments we've seen over the past several years.

A copy of the unpublished disposition is available here.

Judicial Engagement and Non-Compete Litigation

The lack of judicial engagement is a serious thing - particularly in competition disputes.

What do I mean by judicial engagement? For simplicity, I mean a bridge between judicial activism and judicial restraint. It's a method of evaluating and deciding cases, plain and simply.

The term is somewhat in vogue in libertarian circles (which I inhabit) and used when litigants challenge economic regulations on the grounds that they are irrational or impinge on personal liberties.

So when a government enacts a law that restricts economic freedom - say, an occupational licensing requirement - those who favor judicial engagement do not want courts to abdicate their roles. That is to say, courts should not simply defer to whatever the legislature says is a rational justification for the law.

Rather, courts must engage with the evidence and ensure that it supports the need for the law. And on that score, advocates for judicial engagement would argue that protectionism is never a valid governmental interest. Unfortunately, the black-letter rules that attend government economic regulation all but invite trial judges to defer entirely to whatever the legislature says. An overreading of these black-letter principles leads courts to the wrong results, in which they often time rely on theoretical assumptions or abstract hypotheticals.

***

The same decisional framework, judicial engagement, applies to non-compete cases because the applicable legal rule already demand a searching analysis without granting undue deference to the party in whose favor a non-compete runs. So that seems easy enough and a perfectly reasonable analogue to the traditional playing field for the theory of judicial engagement.

I digress for a second, but only a second. As my colleague Jonathan Pollard writes in a recent post, non-competes are first and foremost restraints of trade. Unless we are discussing a negotiated agreement (such as in a sale of business) with real consideration, non-competes are not traditional contracts. They may not even be contracts at all.

When an employer involves the government, here the judiciary, the same liberty concerns arise - with just as much force as an irrational, generally applicable regulation that the legislature passes. The problem that has vexed courts, lawyers, and litigants is how to engage or grapple with the facts in a non-compete dispute. To be sure, judicial restraint is no method of deciding such cases at all.

But many courts employ a burden-shifting approach that all but requires an employee to prove the impossible: that the employer lacks a legitimate business interest in enforcing a restraint. Allowing employers, for instance, simply to mouth some variant of a "legitimate business interest" is not the proper way for a judge to sanction a restraint and impede someone's livelihood.

Let me be clear: nothing in the philosophy of judicial engagement calls upon courts usurp their roles. Just as it is crucial for courts to assess the rationale for governmental regulations of economic activity, it is a moral imperative for them to scrutinize an employer's attempt to enforce through court order a restraint of trade. This is particularly so given the dead weight that enforced and unenforced non-competes have on the economy and productivity.

***

Let's take an example of judicial abdication, rather than engagement. The Kansas case of Servi-Tech, Inc. v. Olson is as bland of a non-compete case as you can get. I've handled some variation of this dispute for 20 years, and this fits within the most basic of fact-patterns, summarized (for simplicity as follows):

• Employee signs a non-compete agreement, containing a broad 2-year market-based restraint wherever the company's clients are located;
• Employee's non-compete also contains a 2-year restriction against soliciting clients with whom he had contact;
• Employee works for 2 years before the company terminates him;
• Employee receives nothing but his job for signing the agreement;
• Employee is assigned 10 clients when he starts;
• Employee's friends and family then comprise 5 additional clients after he starts;
• After being fired, employee stays in the same field and works only with his 5 "friends-and-family" contacts.

The district court enforces the non-solicitation agreement against the employee and includes within the injunction the 5 new clients that joined the company because of their relationship with the employee.

I am simplifying the case for purposes of this discussion. And there are elements of the court's ruling that are proper (if not in reasoning then certainly in result). For instance, the court found the market-based restraint unenforceable, which seems fairly obvious.

But I am concerned about the reasoning in the injunction opinion, particularly its lack of engagement with the facts. On this score, the court seems just to be accepting at theoretical value whatever the employer has said in defense of its broad restraint.

For instance, in discussing the employer's proof of a legitimate business interest, the court said this:

"Olson received some special crop consulting and agronomy training from Servi-Tech, so Servi-Tech has a legitimate business interest to enforce the non-competition clause to protect its investment in him. This, coupled with Servi-Tech's interest of not losing customers, justifies the non-solicitation provision ... that prevents Olson from contacting customers he had worked with as a Servi-Tech employee."

Let's examine this further.

First, the court never describes any aspect of this "training" that the employee, Olson, received. Training if an oft-asserted, rarely convincing "interest" in need of protection. Would companies fail to train people if they lacked non-competes? Does all training incentivize performance or build goodwill? Hardly. The interest is easy to state in the abstract but it often falls apart under even the most basic level of scrutiny. More problematically, the court in Servi-Tech never explains why the particular training received justifies a 2-year work ban (to be fair, it later found the non-compete unreasonable on other grounds). Put differently, the court abdicated its role to assess the proper fit between the asserted interest and the scope of the restriction. 

Second, the interest in "not losing customers" is hardly one to justify a restraint of trade. True, there may be something special about a particular customer relationship - exclusivity, large up-front capital investment - that could justify a customer-based restraint. But no business wants to lose customers. Classifying this as an interest, much less a proven rationale, is judicial abdication and the product of undue deference to whatever the employer says.

Third, the court uses this purported interest to justify a restraint on all customers Olson had worked with at Servi-Tech. But what about the five family members who came to Servi-Tech because of Olson. What does the court say about them: "...they still became Servi-Tech's clients - not Olson's. Once they became Servi-Tech's clients, Servi-Tech was entitled to the benefits of doing business with them." True. That only is relevant, though, for the time Olson worked there. Nothing indicates that Servi-Tech did anything to create goodwill with those small group of personal contacts Olson had. Perhaps they would have come even if Servi-Tech had a poor marketplace reputation. In all likelihood, their fealty was to Olson himself. The court simply used an overbroad rationalization - "they're the employer's clients" - to justify a restraint that limits not just Olson's rights, but those of the clients themselves.

This is not to say, of course, that enforcement of all non-solicitation covenants leads to the same analytical problem. All I am asking for is for courts to engage and not defer. Engage with the facts, as well as the logical conclusions and implications of what the employer alleges.

***

So what must judges do to engage, rather than defer or abdicate? Here are some preliminary suggestions and steps:

(1) Hold the employer to a strict burden of proof. In some states, this is not an option for judges. Unless the legislature has made a qualitative judgment concerning this burden, the employer must bear it at all times.

(2) Evaluate the fit between the asserted business interests, the evidentiary facts, and the scope of the restriction. It is not enough for the employer simply to state an interest it deems worthy of protection. The court must demand hard evidence that supports an interest over and above protectionism. And the employer must demonstrate the logical relationship between the interest and the restraint's reach.

(3) Disaggregate special skills, training, or customer relationships from those that are ordinary or common. Too often, we see employers recasting easily acquired industry knowledge (even if through day-to-day work experience) as trade secrets. And training that is conventional on-the-job training, or gained via everyday work experience, is often something that employers provide regardless of having a signed non-compete. 

(4) Examine the time period of the restraint and assess its fit to the asserted interest. It is insufficient for courts to point to some case 20 years ago where a durationally similar non-compete was enforced. That is not engagement - that's punting.

***

Of course, these are just starting points. I have advocated, too, other approaches such as "quick-look" hearings on adequacy of consideration or facial validity of the agreement. Those may have some utilitarian, pragmatic benefit. But if we're constrained at this point to evaluate all non-compete cases individually, then judges really need to start doing so. No more deference to the employer. No more blind acceptance of allegations that have some theoretical appeal. And no more forgiveness of evidentiary lapses.

The Reading List (2017, No. 25): Eighth Circuit Affirms Damages Award in West Plains Litigation

Non-Compete and Trade Secrets News for the week ended September 1, 2017

***

Jury Verdict Affirmed in West Plains Litigation

The Nebraska case of West Plains, LLC v. Retzlaff Grain is unique in that it belongs in the limited group of trade secrets and unfair competition cases to proceed to jury verdict. The case is garden-variety lift-out, engineered by a former owner of the plaintiff who systematically recruited away key employees to replicate his former business. A Nebraska jury returned a verdict of $1,513,000 in compensatory damages (along with compensation forfeiture in varying amounts against certain ex-employees).

The case is valuable for its discussion of a very common tort that usually accompanies trade-secret or non-compete claims: interference with business relationships. In most cases, interference can be privileged or legally justified if it's for competitive purposes. But interference can be tortious (or wrongful) if done in bad faith, with improper means, or as part of a fraudulent or illegal scheme. Here, the Eighth Circuit found that enough evidence of unjust interference was present in the employees' mass exodus from their former employer. Specifically, the employees used customer lists, documents, and other internal confidential information to plan a coordinated departure. Too, the plaintiff introduced communications that suggested the defendants knew they were acting inappropriately in using their then-employer's information to establish a turn-key competitor from day one.

West Plains shows the value that ancillary tort claims can play in competition cases. With the right facts, it is not always necessary to have a restrictive covenant. To be sure, finding evidence of bad faith or willful misconduct is not easy. But employees seem to keep finding a way to leave digital fingerprints all over the place.

A link to the opinion is available here.

***

Privilege in the Waymo/Uber Fight

Privilege issues in trade secrets litigation can arise in a variety of ways. But those issues extend well beyond garden-variety claims of attorney-client or work-product privilege.

The trade-secrets battle-of-the-millennium in Waymo, LLC v. Uber Technologies, Inc. has featured several intricate disputes over production of privileged materials. In July, Magistrate Judge Corley denied Waymo's efforts to compel Anthony Levandowski - the ex-Google engineer in charge of driverless car technology - to produce documentation and media that would have reflected his retention of 14,000 files belonging to Waymo and that concerned its proprietary LiDAR technology. Given that Levandowski's pre-termination conduct posed a risk that he would be prosecuted for trade-secrets theft, the court found that compelling the production of those files would implicate his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.

But Judge Corley's order denying Waymo's motion to compel went further. She extended the Fifth Amendment privilege to a privilege log that Levandowski had to prepare. The court had required Levandowski to develop the privilege log with enough substance so that Waymo could respond to his Fifth Amendment arguments. As her ruling shows, even the outlines and parameters of a privilege log, without a corresponding production of the logged materials, can provide enough of a link to a potential crime so as to implicate constitutional concerns.

The Order is available at Waymo, LLC v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 17-cv-939, 2017 WL 2864854 (N.D. Cal. July 5, 2017).

An Analysis of Two California Cases. Big California Cases.

Over the past week, we received two big decisions from two different California courts on two vastly different issues. One was a decision that has no precedential effect, but which garnered a lot of headlines, particularly in tech circles. That case was decided correctly. The other received almost no attention, but which is precedential. And that case was wrongly decided.

***

The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and Data Scraping

I have a been a long-time critic of the CFAA, a law put together so haphazardly and over so many years that it is difficult to resolve important questions of statutory interpretation. The key legal question that arises under the CFAA - at least in the context of employee claims - is when one exceeds her authorized access to a protected computer or accesses that computer "without authorization." Put another way, many cases have analyzed claims of insider misappropriation within the CFAA's statutory text, even though it seems clear the statute didn't really have that type of case in mind.

But applying the "without authorization" language of the CFAA goes beyond just employment claims, as reflected in the important case of hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp. The case involved another question of statutory interpretation: whether the CFAA prohibited access to public LinkedIn profiles after LinkedIn revoked permission to such access.

A little background is essential, since the idea of an open internet is crucial to the case's disposition. hiQ Labs is a data analytics company. Its business model revolves around scraping data off of LinkedIn users' public profiles. It then can offer products to its client companies: an analysis of which employees are likely to leave or be recruited (such as by employees updating their skills and other LinkedIn fields) and a separate analysis of which skills individual workers possess.

LinkedIn demanded that hiQ stop scraping public data from its website, relying on its User Agreement and the term that prohibited data collection. hiQ sought injunctive relief, arguing that LinkedIn's threats undermined its business model and violated state statutory and common law. The analysis, though, hinged on the CFAA - for a reading of that statute in LinkedIn's favor would have preempted the offensive claims hiQ brought.

The district court found that the CFAA likely did not preclude hiQ's claims, and it relied on two general concepts. First, it distinguished other cases where CFAA infractions involved access to private, as opposed to public, data. And second, it looked to the law of trespass to conclude that, despite LinkedIn's supposed revocation of hiQ's access to public profiles on its website, hiQ hadn't circumvented any sort of authentication system to view those profiles. This analysis incorporated Professor Orin Kerr's influential Columbia Law Review article that discussed the law of trespass as explaining some of the ambiguity and context of the "without authorization" language in the CFAA.

The decision seems intuitive and obvious, but in large part it was constrained by the text of the CFAA itself, which has confounded courts over the years. Thank goodness we have thought leaders like Orin Kerr to make sense of the statute and provide the appropriate analytical framework on which courts can reconcile very difficult questions. Public websites need to be open and accessible, and operators cannot erect artificial barriers under the guise of an unread, boilerplate user agreement to invoke the specter of criminal liability for viewing and using what's freely available.

Malicious Prosecution

The second decision comes from the Supreme Court of California, where the Court absolved Latham & Watkins for its pursuit of a frivolous trade-secrets claim many years ago. That case made its way up to the Court of Appeal and is somewhat well-known to lawyers (like me) who believe that a robust, common-sense interpretation of "bad faith" is essential to defense fee-shifting claims. The case of FLIR Systems, Inc. v. Parrish, 174 Cal. App. 4th 1270 (2009), was the precursor to Parrish v. Latham & Watkins. In FLIR Systems, the Court of Appeal affirmed a fee award for the prevailing defendants after the plaintiff's trade-secret claim (and the expert testimony girding that claim) fell apart at trial. As the Court had held, the plaintiff's modest success in defeating summary judgment did not insulate the bad-faith fee award. That was a sound rationale: trade secrets plaintiffs often dodge, duck, and distract a trial court into believing there are factual issues in need of resolution.

Unfortunately, for the defendants in that case, the summary-judgment "loss" hurt them in a later, independent malicious prosecution claim that they brought against Latham & Watkins, the law firm that represented FLIR Systems. The Court of Appeal held that the so-called "interim adverse judgment" rule barred the malicious prosecution claim, a decision the Supreme Court of California affirmed last week.

That rule says that a malicious prosecution plaintiff cannot maintain a claim if a "trial court judgment or verdict" is rendered in favor of the plaintiff in the underlying suit - here the FLIR Systems litigation. The problem with applying this rule is that FLIR Systems' defeat of a summary judgment motion is not a judgment in and of itself. It's an interlocutory order that is not even appealable and is a reflection of the trial judge's perception that fact issues need a full airing in court. Indeed, a denial of a summary judgment motion is not a ruling on the merits in any sense.

California is ground-zero for crummy trade secrets claims, so the ruling is an important one. It is particularly important if the plaintiff cannot satisfy a fee award or if the pursuit of the claim caused collateral damage that flowed from the pursuit of the action (such as lost investors, delayed market entry, jettisoned goodwill). A fee award won't cover those damages, but a malicious prosecution suit will. The "interim adverse judgment" rule, applied to denials of summary judgment motions, is an artificial construct that insulates attorneys who pursue claims without an objective, good-faith basis. That they survive a summary judgment is by no means a reflection of the suit's merit, since the trial is where the facts are most tested. Courts need flexibility to assess whether the entirety of the prosecution was malicious, not whether the plaintiff's lawyers were skilled enough to defeat a motion.

An obvious consequence? California courts may see less summary judgment motions. Why risk it after the Latham & Watkins case?